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SYMPOSIUM: THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF SLAVERY REPARATIONS
INTRODUCTION
HANOCH DAGAN, KEITH N. HYLTON, AND ANTHONY J. SEBOK
On April 9th and 10th, 2004, Boston University School of Law sponsored a
symposium titled The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations. As the principal
conference organizers, we are pleased and a bit awestruck to see the
symposium contributions published in this issue of the Boston University Law
Review. The papers published here - in the first symposium of its kind in a
major law review - should serve as an immensely valuable reference on the
jurisprudence of reparations.
The papers gathered in this symposium focus on the legal, moral, and
political dimensions of using private law remedies to redress historic wrongs
arising from the enslavement of various groups of persons in Western nations.
The inspiration for this topic is the lawsuits that have been filed in connection
with slave labor in the context of the Holocaust in Europe and chattel slavery
in the Americas from the Fifteenth to Nineteenth Centuries. We have been
struck by the complexities that lay beneath the surface of these suits.
History has given its verdict on slavery: the institution is wholly rejected
and abjured by all civilized nations today. But the question of whether and
how to redress the wrongs of slavery is still open. It is a peculiar, and yet
perhaps fitting, that in the United States the means of redress have been
predominantly framed in terms of tort law and the law of unjust enrichment.
Some of the themes addressed in this symposium are:
- The role of private law in framing a legal claim for slavery. Are private
law theories "inapt," even if they might be effective in establishing a legal
beachhead for claimants? Should the legal system facilitate suits framed in
terms of unjust enrichment that seem directed towards redress for injuries to
the person, or human dignity, or should it insist that such wrongs be addressed
only with public law tools such as redistribution of income and affirmative
action? Should rights and duties with respect to dignitary wrongs, such as
enslavement, be descendible?
- The role of doctrine in framing a legal claim for redress for slavery. Are
some legal requirements in private law so trivial or quotidian that they ought to
be ignored or suspended in the pursuit of historic justice? How should the
legal system view doctrines such as statute of limitations, or proof of
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causation?
- The role of history in framing a legal claim for redress for slavery. Are
some wrongs so far in the past that they cannot, or ought not, be the subject of
legal analysis? Can a just approach to legal transitions accommodate redress
for slavery?
The symposium contributions can be divided, roughly, into four categories.
One is the topic of unjust enrichment and reparations for slavery. The papers
in this category examine whether the theory of unjust enrichment, or the
doctrine of restitution, provide an appropriate doctrinal home for slavery
reparations. We can subdivide these papers further into three sets. One subset
looks at whether reparations based on unjust enrichment theory devalue or
misrepresent the harms of slavery, treating them as if they were equivalent to
claims for "backpay". Hanoch Dagan argues that because restitution of ill-
gotten gains can serve as a means for vindicating the plaintiffs' autonomy
interests, there is nothing inappropriate in addressing human rights violations
via restitution. Anthony Sebok questions the fit between the structure of
restitution and the interests that slavery litigation hopes to vindicate. He
argues that lawyers who choose to address the wrongs of slavery under the
rubric of "unjust enrichment" seem to be using a legal fiction. Dennis
Klimchuk, on the other hand, argues that framing the slavery suits in terms of
unjust enrichment gets the "moral-expressive content" of the claims exactly
right. He argues that granting restitution to slaves or their heirs for unpaid
wages because the retention of the value of their labor by slaveholders is unjust
makes concrete our rejection of the conception of slaves as chattels, things
from which value can be derived without consent.
Another subset is represented by Emily Sherwin's paper, which argues that
resentment is a constitutive and inevitable feature of restitution. She worries
that, because unjust enrichment invites parties to think of legal redress as a
form of retaliation, it is an inappropriate theory for issues of enormous public
controversy, such as the history of race in the United States. Finally, a third
subset, consisting of Andrew Kull's contribution, examines the actual use of
restitution doctrine in claims brought by former slaves against former masters
on the theory that the former master had held the slave during a period in
which he was entitled to freedom. Kull finds that the courts of slave states
created a special exemption that effectively granted legal immunity to
slaveholders who had acted in good faith.
A second category focuses on doctrinal arguments against reparations
(especially the requirement of causation and the defense of limitations).
Richard Epstein's title, "The Case Against Black Reparations," reveals his
thesis immediately. Epstein provides a careful analysis of Judge Norgle's
arguments in the African Slave Descendants Litigation opinion, which
dismissed several class action suits for slavery reparations. Epstein's paper,
which could be titled "how to avoid making bad arguments against
reparations," demolishes some of Norgle's arguments and takes the surviving
ones - notably the one based on the statute of limitations - and shows how
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they should be stated. James Hackney argues that causation issues are so
difficult to untangle that courts are ill-prepared to find acceptable solutions to
the problem of repairing the injustices of American slavery. Legislative
solutions appear to be the only viable option.
A third topic category begins at this point and focuses on the significance of
the passage of time and the implications of the fact that slavery was in fact
legally-sanctioned (the retroactivity problem). Keith Hylton claims that
applying today's law to slavery should be viewed as bringing law to a regime
from which it had been entirely displaced, not as a retroactive application of a
different set of rules. The more troubling problem for plaintiffs, in his view, is
the passage of time: after enough time has passed, private law shuts the door
on claims based on old and distant injuries. Hanoch Dagan suggests that the
restitutionary defense of bona fides purchaser for value is a plausible tool
(superior to that of limitations) for addressing the intergenerational justice
difficulties raised by historic wrongs, and that law is justified to retroactively
impose some of the burden of our moral progress on beneficiaries of our past
immorality. Anthony Sebok argues that because Dagan's restitution-oriented
solution requires courts to hold that dignitary interests can survive past the
death of those who suffered their injury, lawyers should direct their efforts
towards solving the tort problems raised by Hylton.
A fourth topic category covers alternative solutions to private lawsuits for
reparations. Saul Levmore examines possible reparations schemes in which
the government, through the tax system, permits individuals to make
contingent promises that could be directed toward slavery reparations. Such
"privatized reparations" schemes are attractive, argues Levmore, when citizens
hold disparate and intense views on the wisdom and morality of compensation.
Kyle Logue argues that on both moral and administrative grounds,
redistribution based on race has a surprising appeal. While the moral
arguments are well known, the administrative arguments, familiar largely to
tax scholars, point to the interesting feature that race is an immutable trait that
is strongly correlated with characteristics that would justify taxation or
subsidization. Hence a redistributive program based on race would not risk
creating the large efficiency costs typically associated with income or wealth
redistribution projects. David Lyons argues that the injuries of slavery were all
of a piece with the federal government's treatment of African Americans
throughout this country's history, which provides the moral basis for funding
government programs designed to reduce the gap between the life prospects of
blacks and whites.
As this summary indicates, the range of problems that are raised by the
demand for a legal response for the wrongs of slavery are broad, and the
answers - if there are any - are complex. We are mindful of the strong
political and emotional feelings that the questions of slavery reparations evoke
in many people, feelings which are proportionate to the terrible injuries caused
by slavery itself and the subsequent refusal of American society to deal with
slavery's aftermath. We hope that the papers in this symposium, while
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relatively narrow in their scope, will help frame fruitful discussion in the future
about both the potential and limits of law to deal not only with American
slavery, but widespread historical injustice, whatever its context.
In addition to symposium contributors, there are others who have helped
enormously in putting this project together. We must thank seminar
participants who chose not to submit a paper to this issue: Adrienne Davis of
the University of North Carolina School of Law, Mayo Moran of the Faculty
of Law at the University of Toronto, and Wendy Gordon of the Boston
University School of Law. Their insightful comments and criticisms greatly
improved the quality of the papers submitted. We must also thank Ken Simons
for moderating the first two panels of the meeting and providing several
helpful suggestions to presenters. Andrew Heinz, Adrienne Smith and the
editors of the Boston University Law Review have been extremely patient with
contributors and deserve much of the credit for the final outcome. Finally, we
are grateful to Boston University School of Law, and especially former Dean
Ronald Cass, for institutional support.
